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Abstract: This article examines the socioeconomic effects of the illegal drug industry on 
economic and social development in Colombia. It shows that illegal drugs have fostered 
violence and have had a negative effect on economic development. This article also shows that 
the anti-drug policy Plan Colombia has been a rather ineffective strategy to decrease drug 
production, generate economic development, and reduce violence. Since this study includes 
both, a statistical analysis of the effects violence and illegal drugs have on the economic growth 
of Colombia, as well as an enhanced evaluation of the policy programme Plan Colombia, it 
fills the gap between existing empirical studies about the Colombian illegal drug industry and 
analyses of Plan Colombia.  
 
1. Introduction  
In many Latin American countries there is an on-going discussion on how to tackle the 
economic, social and political problems that are caused not only by the illegal drug industry 
itself but much more by the policies that focus on repressing production and trafficking of 
illegal drugs. The need to reform international drug policy and change the strategy in the war 
on drugs was publicly emphasised by a report of the Latin American Commission on Drugs 
and Democracy (2009). Led by three former Latin American presidents and the Global 
Commission on Drugs and Democracy, the report recognised that the war on drugs in many 
Latin American countries has failed (Campero et al., 2013). However, while this argument of 
the failed war on drugs has gained popularity also throughout the academic literature, there is 
still insufficient analysis of 1) what socioeconomic effects the illegal drug industry has on Latin 
American economies; and 2) what effects anti-drug policies had on reducing the amount of 
produced and trafficked drugs as well as on the economic, political, and social development of 
a country. By analysing the Colombian drug industry and the policy strategy Plan Colombia, 
this article tries to fill the gap that exists in the academic literature.  
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Colombia has the largest illegal drug industry in the region (UNODC, 2014). Furthermore, a 
violent conflict in which the motivation of the different actors is not always clear has been 
swelling in Colombia for many decades. While the principal conflict between an insurgency 
movement of leftist guerrillas and several government-loyal paramilitary groups used to be 
about the political and economic orientation of the country, all actors have increasingly become 
involved in the illegal drug industry (see Chernick, 2012). This connection between violent 
actors and illegal drugs seems to have various consequences for Colombian development since 
the 1990s. 
Even though the illegal drug industry has fostered violence in the country, some scholars find 
that it has helped the Colombian economy to grow at constant stable rates because of to the 
positive income effects of illegal drug dollars (Steiner, 1999). Other scholars contradict these 
results, finding that the drug industry has had negative effects on the economy in the long run, 
especially through fuelling an increase in violence (Thoumi, 2003). While it can be said that 
the Colombian civil conflict has not only been a humanitarian tragedy but also an obstruction 
to social and economic development (Holmes, et al., 2008), the links between the on-going 
violence, the illegal drug industry and economic performance of Colombia remain subject to 
academic discussions. 
The rise in violence and production of illegal drugs in Colombia has implicated several policy 
decisions by the governments of Colombia and the United States of America. Issues of violence 
as well as questions of development in Colombia have always been of special importance to 
the U.S. The main rationale of the U.S. policy towards Colombia, however, remains the 
quelling of the illegal drug industry and trafficking of the illegal substances (Crandall, 2002). 
The most extensive and at the same time controversial anti-drug and anti-insurgency policy has 
been Plan Colombia. The policy programme, which was designed for the period between 2000 
and 2006, was a US$ 7.5 billion strategy to eliminate the production of illegal drugs, to end 
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violence and human rights violations, and to foster economic and social development (Plan 
Colombia, 1999).  
While the Colombian Government under President Pastrana wanted Plan Colombia to be a 
‘Marshal Plan for Colombia’, supported from the wider international community, the metrics 
and goals of the Plan changed from early on. Due to internal pressure from factions of the 
Colombian elite that opposed 1999 peace negotiations and demanded confrontational war 
against the guerrillas, and with rising pressure from the Clinton Administration, Plan Colombia 
became a military strategy for coca crops eradication and training of the Colombian military 
and national police in support of the fight against insurgency movements. With the election of 
far-right wing President Álvaro Uribe in 2002 (and with increased military spending of the 
U.S. after 9/11) Plan Colombia became even more militarised (Rosen, 2014)..  
The U.S. and the Colombian governments have evaluated this militarised strategy as very 
successful in improving security and reducing drug-related violence (GAO, 2008; DNP, 2006). 
However, many critics claim that the military component of the policy programme was actually 
the reason for an increase of social and humanitarian crises in the country (Dion and Russler, 
2008). Hence, the effectiveness of this policy has been put into question. Furthermore, while 
many have argued that Plan Colombia and President Uribe’s full on fight against insurgency 
movements has increased security, some also evaluate the Plan’s security outcomes as 
ambiguous (Bagley, 2012: Rosen, 2014).  
While the policy response through Plan Colombia has been majorly influenced by findings that 
show how the illegal drug industry with its violent actors have corrupted the Colombian state 
and weakened the country’s economy substantially, a link between the empirical proof of how 
the industry influences the society and the evaluation of the effectiveness of the policy plan is 
missing from the academic literature. This study provides this link.  
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With recent advancements in the peace negotiations between the Santos Administration and 
the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia, FARC) in Havana, Cuba, a strategic revision of past policies is necessary. The 
evaluation of Plan Colombia is thus as relevant as ever, as it can help in identifying 
shortcomings of a military peace and drug-control strategy. This can be of value for future 
policy considerations in Colombia if an agreement is reached in Cuba.  
After this introduction that provides a first outline of and insight in the topic, section two 
consists of an overview of the literature discussing the links between illegal drugs and 
socioeconomic development of Colombia, including an analysis of the different actors involved 
in the illegal drug industry. Furthermore, chapter two includes a discussion of the published 
literature that researches the effects of drug-related violence on Colombian economic 
development. The section will also review different strings of literature that evaluate the policy 
reform of Plan Colombia. Section three provides an overview of the methodology used in this 
analysis. The section also describes the somewhat ambiguous nature of the data and variables 
used. Section four will show the results of the empirical analysis, evaluating different data in 
order to thoroughly evaluate the policy programme and its different components. A discussion 
of the findings and of policy alternatives is given in section five. Section six concludes.  
2. Overview and Background: Violence, Illegal Drugs, and Economic Development in 
Colombia 
This section will shed some light on the development of the illegal drug industry and the 
violence present in Colombia, focusing particularly on the different actors involved in drug 
trafficking and in the country’s violent conflict. The section also engages with the academic 
literature discussing theoretical and empirical implications of the illegal drug trade and its 
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effects on economic development. The section concludes with a review of literature that 
analyses anti-drug and crime prevention policies, where the focus lays on contributions 
discussing Plan Colombia.   
2.1 Colombia – A History of Drugs and Violence 
Among the many different illegal drugs industries of Latin America, the Colombian has the 
most diversified structure and still represents one of the largest worldwide (UNODC, 2014). 
According to a 2011 UNODC report, Colombia produces around 70% of the world’s cocaine 
(UNODC, 2011). The Colombian drug industry, however, has not always been as ‘dominant’. 
To fully understand the emergence of the drug industry and its development in recent years, it 
is advisable to have some background knowledge of the history of the violent civil conflict the 
country has been suffering from since the outbreak of La Violencia. It was during the period 
between 1948 and 1960, when the ruling government assassinated at least 200,000 opposition 
activists, which put Colombia in a constant state of civil war and led to widespread poverty and 
economic turbulences (Chomsky, 2000).  
The offspring of the leftist guerrilla Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (better known 
by the Spanish acronyms FARC1) can be identified during the beginnings of this violent 
conflict (Livingstone, 2004). The guerrilla organisation originally stood for a socialist ideology 
and the “specific policies advocated by the FARC during the 1980s included land reform, 
guaranteed base price for agricultural products as well as the provision for agrarian credit, 
health care, and education for peasants” (Rochlin, 2003: 101). However, the FARC have often 
                                                          
1 The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) were not established until 1964. For simplicity 
reasons the acronym “FARC” will subsequently be used to explain the entire leftist guerrilla in Colombia, 
including other powerful organisations, such as the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional, 
ELN). The FARC has been the largest and most influential peasant guerrilla group and can be seen as an 
amalgamation of many leftist rebel groups that arose during the Colombian civil war.   
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changed their rhetoric and tactics and are now more known to fund themselves with 
kidnappings and through controlling illegal drug businesses (Vélez, 2001; Shifter, 1999; 
Rosen, 2014). 
As a result of the increasing influence and popularity of Marxist movements against the 
established power structures, paramilitary and counter-revolutionary groups were formed 
(Cubides, 2001). Until 1989 these paramilitary groups were legal and supported by the 
Colombian government to help in the war against the guerrilla groups (Holmes et al., 2008). 
The financing of the paramilitaries by different elite factions, however, continued in the 1990s 
and 2000s. The paramilitary group Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defence 
Forces of Colombia, AUC) can be pointed out as the most prominent force, which despite its 
official demobilisation in 2006/08 continues to have large influence over Colombia’s political 
and economic landscape (Ronderos, 2014).  
While the FARC and the AUC were originally born out of political convictions and out of an 
opposition to certain political conditions in the country, both groups eventually became the two 
main actors of the entire Colombian drug industry (Gugliotta and Leen, 1990, Echandía 
Castilla, 2001). It was especially during the 1990s, after the dismantling of the main drug 
cartels of Medellin and Cali and the killing of Colombia’s most influential figure of the illegal 
drug industry Pablo Escobar in December 1993, when both the FARC as well as the AUC got 
increasingly involved in the production of illegal drugs and in the international drug trade. The 
biggest rationale behind this was the funding of armoury and other equipment for their wars 
(Echandía Castilla, 2001).  
Another actor to be mentioned when talking about the violent conflict is the Colombian 
Government, which in the beginning of the civil conflict was the main target of the FARC 
(Rochlin, 2003). The Colombian military plays a separate role in this conflict, as the main 
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emphasis of policy reform programmes has been the strengthening of the official armed forces 
in the war on guerrilla groups and illegal drug producers (Rochlin, 2003). The government of 
the United States has to be mentioned as well, since it was also in the 1980s when the U.S. 
became increasingly involved in the Colombian conflict. For the U.S., the above outlined 
“Narco-Guerrilla connection […] provided the possibility to kill two birds with one stone, since 
it could link its antidrug policies with anticommunist policies in the region” (Thoumi, 1995: 
195).  
There is a big difference between the “old” violent civil conflict of the 1960s and the rather 
new phenomenon of drug-related violence. However, both conflicts are highly interconnected 
through the increased activities of both rebel groups in illegal drug activities (Mugge, 2004). 
Many different parallels can be identified between the two different stages of the conflict, so 
that some scholars and academic observers legitimately talk about “Colombia’s endless civil 
war” (Moore, 2003: 2).  
2.2 Illegal Drugs and Development: A Conventional Wisdom? 
The academic findings on the impact of illegal drugs on the economy are diverging. On one 
hand, some literature finds positive effects of the illegal drug industry on Colombia’s economic 
development. On the other hand, more recent contributions find rather negative economic 
impacts. 
One of the first academic papers that economically examines income effects of the 
“underground economy of Colombia” is the article by Junguito and Caballero (1982). By 
calculating the income variables of all involved actors the authors estimate the gross income 
of illegal drugs to be between 16 and 28 billion US Dollar (using the 1978 dollar), in the period 
since the early 1960 until 1978. The authors come to the conclusion that Colombian drug 
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exports in 1978 made up 3.6% of total GDP2. The Colombian economist Eduardo Sarmiento 
(1990) makes similar estimations for the years 1981–1988. Assuming that his calculations for 
the wholesale prices of cocaine in the U.S. are right, he estimates that drug-related income of 
Colombia during the observed time frame was between US$ 900 million and US$ 1.3 billion, 
which were equivalent to around 1.6% of GDP during that period (Sarmiento et al., 1990).  
Rocha (1997) in his estimations of the Colombian net revenue from illegal drugs between 1980 
and 1994 also finds positive economic effects of the drug industry. He shows that in the 
observed period the average income generated by illegal drugs was between US$ 2.5 and 4 
billion annually. This is equivalent to 1.2%–4.7% of total GDP (Rocha, 1997: 239-43; see table 
1). Another important study that focuses on the positive income effects of the Colombian drug 
industry is the study of Steiner (1998). He estimates that the net dollar income of the total of 
illicit drugs from 1980 to 1983 in Colombia was around US$ 2 billion a year (Steiner 1998: 
1015-21; table 1).  
Thoumi (2003) criticises these findings and identifies several measurement biases of positive 
effects of illegal drugs. Steiner (1998) and Rocha (1997), as well as Junguito and Caballero 
(1982) do not sufficiently take transportation costs into account that affect wholesale and retail 
prices in consumer markets. Since there is very little reliable data about transportation costs of 
trafficking routes through Central America and the Caribbean to the U.S., the actual domestic 
production price might be much lower than estimated, which would diminish the income effect 
of Colombian drug producers on the economy (Thoumi, 2003).  
                                                          
2 Steiner (1998) evaluates the findings by Junguito and Caballero (1982) and finds that hat 
they used a GDP estimate of 1978 that was inaccurate. The actual GDP in 1978 was around 
US$ 30 billion, Junguito and Caballero (1982) used a much smaller estimate, and so the 
figure of 3.6% is rather inaccurate.    
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A study by the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) from 2002 finds further 
shortcomings in the positive literature. While neither Rocha (1997), nor Steiner (1998) look at 
potential long-term socioeconomic effects of the illegal drug industry, the INCB study 
explicitly stresses this shortcoming (INCB, 2002). Hence,  
“contrary to the widespread perception that income generated from the illicit drug 
industry automatically fosters economic development, there are no indications that the 
expansion of illicit crop cultivation has led to an overall improvement in the economic 
situation or to the improvement of any broader development indicator at the national 
level. While there is evidence that sales of illicit drugs can foster economic 
development in the short term, the question remains whether that leads to a process of 
sustainable development in the long term”. (INCB, 2002: 4)  
An examination of the impact of illegal drugs on Colombia’s social problems through the on-
going violent conflict is missing in most academic literature that focuses on positive economic 
impacts of the Colombian drug industry.  
The critical literature is largely in agreement over the fact that “the drug trade has in fact 
weakened the country’s economy by fostering violence and corruption, undermining legal 
activity, frightening off foreign investment, and all but destroying the social fabric” (Thoumi, 
1995, cited in Holmes et al., 2008: 10). Thoumi (1995) concludes that the Colombian economy 
would be better off without the illegal drug industry, since negative effects outweigh the 
positive income effects. These negative effects are mainly found in the fact that the illegal drug 
industry  
“has blocked government attempts to redistribute lands […]; it has made 
macroeconomic policy more complex and government policy more uncertain; it has 
forced a redistribution of government expenditures from promoting growth to security 
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and arms; it has encouraged a ‘get rich quick’ mentality; and it makes investment 
choices based on the need to launder and hide capital”. (Thoumi, 1995: 294).  
Furthermore, Thoumi (1995) recognises that the large influx of foreign exchange through narco 
dollars has led to the phenomena known as Dutch Disease3.  
However, one of the biggest problems that challenge the results of Thoumi (1995) is that he 
mainly focuses on direct industry effects and too little on indirect socioeconomic consequences. 
This is mainly because of the fact that it is not until the late 1990s (when the divestiture of the 
Medellin and Cali Cartels created a power vacuum) that left-wing guerrillas and right-wing 
paramilitary organisations started to become increasingly involved in the Colombian illegal 
drug industry (see Seelke et al., 2011). This development was primarily accompanied by an 
increase in violence and crime (CINEP, 20084). In recent research on economic effects of the 
drug industry scholars include this shift of drug influence and hence drug income in their 
calculation of indirect negative economic effects of the illegal drug industry.  
Roldán (1999) finds that even though the illegal drugs industry can spur demand through 
increased employment, these effects are only positive in the short-run. Her detailed analysis of 
the Medellin Cartel and its leader Pablo Escobar shows that the Cartel mainly had negative 
effects by destabilising the state and sustainably changing the structure of power in Colombia. 
After the killing of Pablo Escobar the highly corrupt Colombian authorities with its weak 
institutions were not able to stabilise the political system (Roldán, 1999). Corruption in form 
of financing electoral campaigns through drug money prevailed as well as organised crime and 
                                                          
3 The “Dutch Disease” is an economic phenomenon that describes the effect a drastic increase of export demand 
for a specific good has on the currency (=currency overvaluation). Hence, other exports are less competitive and 
the competitiveness of foreign imports rises. This again can cause deindustrialization and slows down economic 
development.  
4 This study categorise different human rights violations as “violence”, including all involved actors: FARC; 
AUC; Police, National Military, etc. (see CINEP, 2008) 
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insurgency, which discouraged growth-enhancing investment and sound macroeconomic 
decision-making (INCB, 2002). These indirect negative long-run effects of illegal drugs on the 
Colombian economy outweighed the positive short-term income gains from drug income 
(Roldán, 1999). Camacho and López (2000) make similar findings for the area of the Cauca 
valley and the post-Cali Cartel era. The INCB study of 2002 picks up on this analysed negative 
consequence and concludes that “the destabilization of the state is usually the most serious 
consequence of the existence of a large illicit drug industry in a country” (INCB, 2002: 5). This 
is particularly evident in Colombia, where the illegal drug industry has acted as a catalyst of 
power, which “has contributed to the country’s stagnation” (Thoumi, 2003: 191).  
Holmes and Gutiérrez de Piñeres (2006) as well as by Holmes et al. (2006; 2008) provide a 
series of very extensive studies on the Colombian illegal drug industry and its effects on 
violence and economic development. While most other previously discussed studies generally 
focus on the effects of the drug trade on the national economy, Holmes et al. (2006; 2008) 
provide a quantitative analysis of the economic effects on the local level. They come to the 
conclusion that while “drug production fuels violence in Colombia” (2006: 157) it “does not 
have independent effects on exports or GDP” (Holmes and Gutiérrez de Piñeres, 2006: 104, 
emphasis added). Their results suggest “that Colombia’s economic problems stem more from 
political violence than from the drug trade in itself” (Holmes and Gutiérrez de Piñeres, 2006: 
1). 
However, even though it can be concluded that the negative and sometimes indirect economic 
effects of the illegal drug trade in the long-run outweigh the short-term positive income effects 
(Roldán, 1999), the recent academic literature only shows these negative effects without 
analysing potential or already implemented policies that have followed the acknowledgement 
of the harmfulness of the illegal drug industry.  
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The next section discusses the literature that analyses such policies, with a particular emphasis 
on Plan Colombia. However, the literature discussing policy implications often implicitly 
assumes that the illegal drug industry and its violence have negative effects on the country’s 
development without further discussing whether this fact is relevant to the discussed policy. 
This study tries to link both strands of literature together.  
2.3 Anti-Drug and Crime Prevention Policies in Colombia 
With Colombia being the largest producer of cocaine in the world and the United States being 
the largest consumer of this psychoactive substance (UNODC, 2014), the US-Colombian 
relations have been highly affected by the state of the cooperation between the two countries 
in implementing anti-drug policies (Murillo, 2004). The strategy in the war on drugs has been 
constantly evolving and reached its climax when the so-called Plan Colombia was introduced 
in 1999 (Nagle, 2002).  
Steiner (1999) focuses on the evolution of U.S. policies towards Colombia since the 1970s. and 
on how the “quiet and reserved diplomacy” (Tokatlian and Botero, 1990, cited in Steiner, 1999: 
161) of the Nixon administration and the administration of Colombia’s President Julio César 
Turbay was the starting point of anti-drug cooperation. However, the Colombian-U.S. relations 
soon became ‘narcotised’ and evolved to the point where anti-drug policies were the main 
rationale behind any development and economic aid efforts from the U.S. towards the Latin 
American country.  
Crandall (2002) makes similar conclusions about U.S.-Colombian relations. He evaluates them 
as highly “militarized” and after 1994, when Ernesto Samper was elected President, even as 
“hypernarcotized” (Crandall, 2002: 45). However, Crandall (2002) concludes that all the 
efforts of the U.S. in curtailing drug-production and preventing trafficking of illegal drugs have 
been ineffective. The increased militarisation of U.S.-Colombian relations, eradication 
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strategies, and extradition agreements were ultimately “not achieving the desired effect of 
reducing the amount of drugs flooding into the United States” (Crandall, 2002: 45).  
The administration of Andrés Pastrana, who was elected President in 1998, wanted to change 
the government’s approach to violence and the drug economy entirely. Pastrana’s double 
strategy included peace negotiations with the FARC on one hand, and a “big-push” policy to 
mitigate direct and indirect socioeconomic effects of the drug industry (Rosen, 2014). The 
primary focus was to achieve peace and development, through a “'Marshall Plan' for Colombia, 
which would allow investments into social development” (Pastrana, 2005: 50-1). Anti-drug 
and anti-insurgency targets were only a secondary issue for Pastrana’s original policy proposal 
(Rosen, 2014). However, and due internal pressure and external influence of the Clinton 
Administration the policy formula changed and became highly militarised (Crandall, 2002).  
In 1999 the U.S. gave the Colombian government an “aid” package of US$ 1.3 billion, which 
mainly consisted of military-related equipment and armour (Schneider, 2003). This military 
the beginning of Plan Colombia. The policy plan, designed for the period between 2000 and 
2006, was a more frontal strategy against guerrilla, paramilitary and other drug-producing and 
trafficking groups to reduce violence in the country (Schneider, 2003; Plan Colombia, 1999). 
In addition to the military component of Plan Colombia, the policy was laid out to provide an 
intensified aerial spraying of crops of coca bushes and poppy plants. While aerial spraying for 
eradication efforts had already been going on during the 1980s – mainly to confine the growing 
of marijuana plants (Crandall, 2002; Steiner, 1999) –the agenda of this new Plan included a 
dramatic increase of sprayings. The militarisation and “vietnamising” of Colombia (Steiner, 
1999: 162) were reasons for the European Union not to give support to Plan Colombia, making 
the policy an exclusive initiative of the U.S. – other than Pastrana’s original plan of getting 
support from the wider international community (Pastrana, 2005). 
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The objectives of this joint policy strategy were threefold: first, the eradication efforts should 
help to reduce illicit coca crops and poppy plants by 50% in six years; second, economic and 
social justice should be promoted; and third, violence should be reduced to help the economy 
to develop (Mejía et al., 2011; DNP, 2006). In the period between 2000 and 2006, the 
governments of the United States and Colombia together spent an average amount of US$ 1.2 
billion annually on the military part of Plan Colombia, which is similar to about 1.5% of the 
Colombia’s GDP per capita per year. This militarisation of Plan Colombia could lead to the 
perception that the war on drugs was mainly about interests of the Clinton Administration to 
support the U.S. military industry and to wipe out the FARC, which after all is the longest-
running active Marxist guerrilla in Latin America.  
After 9/11 and the victory of Álvaro Uribe in the 2002 Presidential elections the metrics and 
goals of the Plan changed further as the policy became even more militarised (Rosen, 2014). 
Uribe, who has had direct links to paramilitary leaders (Ospina, 2013; Semana, 2015), 
expanded military operations linked to Plan Colombia as part of his “democratic security 
policy” launched in 2003 (Romero, 2007). The further militarisation, however, exclusively 
targeted the FARC (for example. through the 2003 Plan Patriota). The paramilitary had 
beneficiary treatment: ex paramilitary leaders and combatants where offered short prison 
sentences and support in their reintegration with the Demobilization, Disarmament and 
Reintegration Programme (DD&R) that started in 2004. At the same time, the Uribe 
administration continued to institutionally support active paramilitary members with 
intelligence and finance for the fight against the FARC (Romero, 2007; Ospina, 2013). There 
was thus a clear qualitative distinction made by the government between FARC violence and 
paramilitary violence. This is also why this study fundamentally disagrees with analyses that 
fail to recognise a differentiation between the different types of violence and fail to include a 
15 
 
discussion of government or government-induced violence (see for example DeShazo et al., 
2007, 2009; GOA, 2008).  
The literature relevant to our discussion on the war on drugs and U.S. development policies 
towards Colombia all focus on the economic, environmental, and social consequences of Plan 
Colombia (e.g. Hylton, 2010; Mejía et al., 2011; Mejía and Restrepo, 2008; Moreno-Sanchez 
et al., 2003; Dion and Russler, 2008; Stokes, 2001). While different scholars have different 
approaches to evaluate the effectiveness and the socioeconomic impact of the Plan, most come 
to the conclusion that it is just another milestone in the instrumentalisation of U.S. aid policies 
towards Latin America.  
Hylton (2010: 111) mainly discusses how the counterinsurgency of the U.S. through Plan 
Colombia has caused “astonishing cost in human lives and livelihoods”. He finds evidence that 
Plan Colombia has failed in achieving most of its goals, mainly because substantial mistakes 
have been made in terms of building functioning institutions. He furthermore finds results that 
“under Plan Colombia, narco-paramilitary mafias assumed the role of, and overlapped with, 
the state in most frontier regions” (Hylton, 2010: 108). Through the intensified aerial sprayings 
of rural land to prevent the cultivation of new coca crops, which had negative external effects 
on productive land for the licit agriculture (Mugge, 2004). 
Dion and Russler (2008) put these eradication efforts of Plan Colombia in form of aerial 
spraying at the centre of their analysis. Using an OLS model the authors calculate the 
relationships between aerial eradication, the cultivation of coca crops, and social factors, such 
as displacement of residents living in eradication areas. The eradicating efforts between 2000 
and 2006 have had a rather small and statistically insignificant impact on the overall coca 
cultivation (Dion and Russler, 2008). However, the aerial sprayings have significant impacts 
on the levels of forced displacement. Plan Colombia is causing “unintended human and 
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economic costs, [which] should be explicitly considered and addressed by policy makers” 
(Dion and Russler, 2008: 418). These costs are identified in the increase of unemployment and 
poverty in agricultural regions, where the aerial sprayings have been carried out (Dion and 
Russler, 2008). This increase in poverty in rural areas has furthermore caused a vicious cycle. 
The evidence suggests that there are more incentives to engage in illegal drug-producing 
activities “in economically underdeveloped, agricultural regions where residents […] lack 
access to legal markets due to poor public infrastructure and a weak state presence” (Dion and 
Russler, 2008: 419).  
Mejía and Restrepo (2008) in their evaluation of Plan Colombia criticise that even though some 
of the intended goals of coca eradication had been successful, the potential drug production in 
Colombia has actually only decreased by around 14% from the time of the implementation of 
the policy until the scheduled end of the Plan in 2006 (UNODC, 2008). Mejía and Restrepo 
(2008) conclude that Plan Colombia has led to suboptimal usage of resources by the U.S. and 
the Colombian governments. Their analysis ends with the conclusion that due to an increase of 
per hectare coca productivity the Plan failed to reduce the actual produced amount of cocaine 
in Colombia. Furthermore, the authors find that the eradication efforts have led to a “balloon 
effect”, which describes a geographical shift of coca cultivation to Peru and Bolivia following 
interdiction in Colombia (Mejía and Restrepo 2008). 
A link to the negative long-run effects of the drug industry and the violence on Colombia’s 
economic development is largely missing from the literature discussing past and present 
policies. This is also due to the fact that it is often implicitly assumed that the drug industry 
causes harmful effects for economic growth and development. The next section introduces the 
methodology and data with which this study analyses socioeconomic effects the drug industry 
has, as well as policy responses with Plan Colombia.   
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3 Methods and Data 
The following two sections engage with a discussion about the methodology and data used in 
this study. We use data from a variety of different sources and run different regressions using 
the econometric OLS model.  
3.1 Methodology 
To analyse the effects of the Colombian illegal drug industry on the country’s economy it is 
necessary to look at direct and indirect costs (Cardenas, 2007). In a first analysis we will 
identify the logical connections between the illegal drug industry and economic issues of 
Colombia. After this, the study will follow the approach of Holmes et al. (2008) and Dion and 
Russler (2008) who use an ordinary least squares fixed-effects model (OLS) and visual 
statistical graphics analysis to measure the economic effects of illegal drugs and drug-related 
violence in Colombia. By using aggregated data at the national level this study analyses and 
estimates the relationships between violence, cocaine and coca production, and economic 
development. Equation (1) describes the principle form of the OLS regression: 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽1𝑋𝑋1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ⋯+ 𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
Where 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the dependent variable, i is entity (Colombia), t equals time, X explains the 
different independent variables, 𝛽𝛽1n is the coefficient of each independent variable, αi (i=1…n) 
represents unknown constant for each entity (n entity-specific intercepts), and u is the error 
term.   
This OLS model is used since it is commonly recognised that unobservable heterogeneity 
biases are reduced through OLS estimations (Stock and Watson, 2007). The estimated OLS 
model will be done with heteroscedastic panel corrected standard errors accounts (HAC 
standard error) for panel heteroscedasticity. 
[1] 
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The empirical analysis and the application of equation [1] will be split between two periods. 
Firstly, an analysis of the period prior the introduction of Plan Colombia will show whether we 
can find empirical evidence of a statistical relationship between cocaine production, violence, 
and economic growth, which would justify the policy programme. Secondly, an analysis of the 
period after Plan Colombia will show whether Plan Colombia has been effective in reaching 
its goals. This before-and-after analysis helps to identify to some extent whether the policy 
programme was effective. 
The time variable for the period before the implementation of Plan Colombia is T=7 for the 
years 1993-1999. Results will be obtained by firstly analysing the question whether cocaine 
production is harmful for economic growth or if it brings benefits for the Colombian economy. 
In this analysis, the dependent variable is the lagged value of GDP per capita. After this analysis 
of the pre-Plan Colombia period, a graphical analysis will show how effective Plan Colombia 
has been in terms of reducing violence and cocaine production as well as the eradication affords 
of the Colombian and U.S. governments. Furthermore, we will conduct several regressions 
analysing the effects of military spending through Plan Colombia on the amount of cocaine 
produced in the country. A similar analysis will show whether the spending was effectively 
used to reduce violence. We use the same OLS model shown in equation [1] to estimate the 
effectiveness of the expenditure of the Colombian and U.S. governments towards economic 
development and growth. Another regression will show the relationship between the 
eradication efforts of the Plan in form of aerial spraying and the phenomenon of forced internal 
displacement. The time period for this analysis will be the years of Plan Colombia’s original 
implementation time between 2000 and 2006 (T=7). 
In all cases there is a relatively short time period of the data. This is deliberate, as it allows us 
to ignore any year fixed effects (Ashenfelter, et al., 2003). However, it is necessary to make 
19 
 
the assumption that there are no unobservable time specific variables affecting the outcome of 
the regression (Holmes et al., 2006).  
3.2 Data 
The data used for obtaining statistically significant results consists of a unique set of Colombian 
data from the country’s government, the Colombian non-governmental human rights 
organisation Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular (Centre for Research and Popular 
Education, CINEP) and the United Nations. The economic indicators such as GDP, export, 
unemployment and poverty are provided by the Departamento Administrativo Nacional de 
Estadística (National Administrative Department of Statistics, DANE). The variables for 
paramilitary and FARC violence, as well as the data for violence of the public forces are drawn 
from the CINEP data bank5. The variable of “violence” always describes the total human rights 
violations of the respective actor and does not include civilian casualties in fighting actions 
between the several different legal and illegal armed forces. Violent crimes such as executions, 
threats, kidnappings and torture are included. Numbers for the homicide rate for the time series 
are taken from the Colombian Vice President’s office.  
The data about the harnessing and eradication of coca crops as well as the data for cocaine 
production are from different World Drug Reports of the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC) and its satellite imagery program in Colombia (SIMSI), which operates since 
1999 (UNODC, 2010). Until 1999 the Colombian police provided the estimations of coca 
production. The data for the production of the final product cocaine is provided by calculations 
                                                          
5  The data from CINEP has been criticised and challenged by some observers, especially by U.S. embassy 
officials. For example, the editor of the Wall Street Journal O'Grady writes that the U.S. embassy and U.S. 
officials have criticised CINEP, as its “methodology creates a heavy bias against the Colombian government” 
(O'Grady, 2004, cited from Holmes et al., 2006: 178). However, as CINEP’s data often does not vary from 
official numbers given by Colombian officials, its data is relatively accurate (Holmes, et al. 2006). Furthermore, 
since this study will only use violence data from CINEP, it has, if any, a bias that is consistent throughout time. 
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of UNODC. Other than in previous studies, such as Holmes et al. (2006; 2008), the data for the 
harnessing of coca crops and cocaine production will be distinguished, since there is a huge 
divergence between the development of coca crops production and the production of the actual 
end product cocaine (see in the following section). The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) 
provides an extensive dataset for the internal refugees in Colombia. The data variables used in 
the regressions are consistent over the two observed time periods (1993-1999 and 2000-2006). 
This makes it appropriate to compare the results.  
It has to be recognised that concerns and doubts about some of the data are legitimate. While 
the data about economic variables, social factors and political violence are rather exact the 
illegal nature of the Colombian drug industry makes it extremely difficult to make precise 
estimations of actual quantitative numbers. The analysis of this study does not claim that the 
numbers of the transacted products or the estimations of illegal harnessing of coca crops are 
100% accurate. Even though the satellite-based system of the UNODC is more precise than the 
former estimations by the National Police, it remains doubtful that all coca crops can be 
identified, since many coca fields are located in jungle areas and remain undetected. Thoumi 
(2005: 186) also points out, that politicians, journalists or even the whole government misuse 
the data of the drug industry “to buttress preconceived and personal agendas”.  Furthermore, 
“the emotional and ideological charge carried by most data users leads to widespread data 
misuse.” (Thoumi, 2005: 186). These measurement biases have to be kept in mind when 
estimating the economic cost and analysing the social effects of the Colombian drug industry.  
4 Findings 
The above presented literature analysis has shown that the illegal drug industry has affected 
the Colombian society in a substantial way. However, some questions remain to be answered 
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empirically. Does a high percentage of coca crops and cocaine production really have a 
statistically significant impact on the economic performance of Colombia? Is there correlation 
between the production of illegal drugs and violence? Is there a relationship between violence 
and the economic performance of Colombia? Is there a difference between the effects of 
violence caused by paramilitary groups and the leftist guerrilla? Is the policy of Plan Colombia 
effective in reducing the production of illegal drugs and of drug related violence? And has the 
Plan affected the numbers of forced displaced people in Colombia? The next sections try to 
answer these questions empirically. 
4.1 GDP and cocaine production: 1993-1999 
While Colombia’s economy grew during the 1970s and ‘80s, the increase in illicit coca bush 
cultivation and cocaine production in the 1990s did not lead to an acceleration of this growth 
(DANE, 2005). Looking at the time period just before Plan Colombia was implemented the 
Colombian economy actually witnessed a massive decline in GDP per capita. While GDP 
growth rates in the first half of the 1990s were at a constant rate around 4.5%, it started to 
decline from 1997 and hit rock bottom in 1999, with a negative growth rate of minus 4.2% 
(figure 1). Simultaneously, the amount of the produced cocaine in Colombia increased by over 
6% and reached its peak in 1999 with more than 160,000 hectares of cultivated coca plants 
(UNODC, 2008). Figure 1 shows the relationship between the economic performance of 
Colombia and the amount of cultivated coca leaves in Colombia. 
With this graphical analysis, however, it remains unclear whether there is a statistically 
significant impact of cocaine production on GDP growth. Applying the OLS regression, we 
find that the production of cocaine is statistically negative associated with GDP per capita 
growth, which may be evidence for a causal relationship. This result is in line with the findings 
of Thoumi (2003), Roldán, 1999 and Camacho and López (2000). The findings are, however, 
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inconsistent with the analysis of Holmes et al. (2006; 2008), who do not find direct negative 
effects of the coca production on the economic growth. This divergence can be caused by the 
fact that Holmes et al. (2006; 2008) analyse growth effects on the local level and that they use 
a different data set. Holmes et al. (2006; 2008) use data for the production of coca; the 
independent variable used in this analysis, however, is the amount of produced cocaine. 
However, these findings should be analysed with caution, as they may accrue from a 
simultaneous effect of other policies or variables that are not included in the regression. 
4.2 Illegal Drugs and Violence: 1993-1999  
For both violence and coca cultivation there was a steady increase throughout the 1990s. Figure 
2 provides an overview of the annual national trends in violence and cocaine cultivation from 
the period prior to the implementation of Plan Colombia. Human rights violations committed 
by the governmental forces (police, army and other official armed forces) have been fairly 
stable over time. A slight increase can be seen from 1997 until 1999 (CINEP, 2011). The human 
rights violations by the FARC rebels were at constant low levels, peaking in 1992 and 1994. A 
drastic increase in FARC violence can be seen in 1999. Paramilitary violence on the other hand 
spiked in 1996 at a rather high value before it increased in 1999. The amount of hectares of 
cultivated coca has in general followed the violence trends during the years 1990-1999, peaking 
in 1999 (see figure 2). 
To see which kind of violence is caused by the illegal drug industry, this subsection follows 
the approach of Mejía and Restrepo (2011), who use OLS estimations to prove whether or not 
the illegal drug industry has a direct effect on violence. For a detailed analysis disaggregated 
descriptive statistical data is needed. On table 2 we see some of the disaggregated data for the 
years 1994 until 2008 used by Mejía and Restrepo (2011) that are also used for the OLS 
estimations applied here. After controlling for the presence of the two main illegal armed 
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groups (FARC and paramilitary), the results show that there is a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between homicides and the value of coca (table 3). Hence, the activities 
of the Colombian cocaine market have a positive and significant relationship with the homicide 
rate. In locations with high presence of illegal armed groups the correlation between coca value 
and homicide is higher, which implies that coca production fuels violence in form of an increase 
in homicides committed by the illegal armed groups (table 3).  
Furthermore and more important, the coefficient of the value of coca remains at a very high 
statistical significance of 99%. These results are not surprising, as they are in line with the 
results of most academic scholars (see for example Mejía and Restrepo, 2011; Holmes et al., 
2008). Violence and human rights violations of the illegal armed forces are therefore to some 
extent generated by their illegal activities in the drug market. As a result, we can say that 
paramilitary and FARC violence as well as the homicide rate in general are fuelled by an 
increase in the value of the cocaine market in Colombia.  
4.3  Violence and Economic Development: 1993-1999 
To empirically prove the link between the violence caused by the illegal armed forces and the 
economic development of Colombia we use OLS estimations in form of the model given in 
equation [1]. Using the lagged value of FARC and paramilitary human rights violations as 
independent variables we test the statistical correlation these variables have with GDP per 
capita. The data only include variables from the period between 1993 and 1999.  
Figure 2 shows that FARC human rights violations constantly increased from 1993 until 1999. 
Our OLS results furthermore suggest that negative growth rates contribute to FARC violence 
in a statistically significant way. A decrease in economic activity could contribute in the 
increase of the pool of potential fighters for the FARC as it facilitates the recruitment of 
unemployed for the peasant army. Paramilitary violence is positively correlated with FARC 
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human rights violations. This result, which is consistent with the findings of Holmes et al. 
(2008), can be explained by the fact that the FARC respond with an increased insurgent 
violence to increased paramilitary presence. The relationship between FARC violence and 
government human rights violation is significantly negative, which shows that an increase in 
violence by the government forces decreases FARC violence (Table 4).  
The findings made for paramilitary violence are somewhat divergent to the findings made for 
the FARC. Hence, even though paramilitary violence was also increasing in the 1990s, with 
the exception of 1992 and 1997 (figure 2), a positive relationship is found between human 
rights violations of the paramilitary and GDP (table 5). This result is consistent with the 
findings of Holmes et al. (2008). They explain this positive relationship with the fact that some 
paramilitary groups emerged to protect investments and hence, with the decrease in economic 
growth in the 1990s there was a decrease in illegal paramilitary activity. There were simply not 
many investments left to protect.  
FARC violence and paramilitary violence are positively and significantly related. A rise in 
FARC human rights violations is answered by an increase in paramilitary violence. 
Contrasting, an increase in human rights violations of the official armed forces is positively 
related to paramilitary violence (table 5). This result may be explained by the fact that many 
government forces are often linked with the likely minded paramilitary (Tate, 2001). The 
statistical analysis furthermore shows that FARC violence is inversely related to GDP in a 
statistically significant way and is therefore harmful for economic growth – or that increased 
paramilitary violence, which rises with economic growth, diminishes violence of the FARC. 
Paramilitary violence, on the other hand has a statistically positive impact on GDP per capita, 
which is in line “with the theory that paramilitary groups protect resources” (Holmes et al., 
2008: 131).  
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All the above-presented findings give some explanation of the rationales that were behind the 
introduction of Plan Colombia and the form in which it was realised. One major goal of Plan 
Colombia was the reduction of the production and distribution of cocaine, which was seen as 
a fuel of violence and economic underperformance (Plan Colombia, 1999). The results given 
above support this view and also give an explanation to why the main emphasis of the military 
component of Plan Colombia was the fighting of FARC rebels. However, the results also 
suggest that in order to reduce violence and cocaine production, it is crucial for the Colombian 
economy to develop. Hence, it is necessary to work from both directions, to reduce the cocaine 
production and to foster economic development.  
4.4 Plan Colombia: Cocaine Production 
One of the main goals set out by Plan Colombia was the containment of cocaine production 
(Plan Colombia, 1999). To achieve this goal military expenditure of Colombia as well as U.S. 
aid to Colombian military and police increased dramatically with Plan Colombia. During the 
period between 2000 and 2006 the U.S. government spent over 540 million US$ annually on 
the military component of Plan Colombia (GAO, 2008), out of which almost 70% were 
allocated to eradicate coca plants (see tables 6 and 7 for details). And indeed, the results were 
somewhat positive, as the amount of cultivated coca in Colombia decreased by over 50%, from 
160,000 hectares in 2000 to 74,000 hectares in 2006 (figure 3). However, the UNODC reports 
that the potential cocaine production decreased by only 5.3% (UNODC, 2011; figure 3). The 
divergence is attributed to the fact that the Colombian drug producing cartels and illegal armed 
groups seem to have adjusted to the reduction of the cultivated coca crops, as they have 
increased the productivity of coca per hectare6 (Mejía, 2009; figure 4). 
                                                          
6 This increase can also be the consequence of improved production techniques and methods. 
Larger and more powerful coca plants are cultivated, which again increases the density of 
coca plants per hectare (UNODC, 2011). 
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Looking at the results from figures 3 and 4 we can say that it does not seem that Plan Colombia 
was very effective in reducing the amount of cocaine produced in Colombia. This result is also 
found applying an OLS regression with the lagged value for cocaine production as dependent 
variable, and eradication efforts (aggregated data of manual and aerial eradication), U.S. 
assistance allocated to Plan Colombia, as well as the military expenditure of the Colombian 
government as the independent variables. We find no statistical significance for either of the 
independent variables (Table 8). The results show that while Plan Colombia has been effective 
in eradication of coca plants, it did not have any significant effects on the overall potential 
cocaine production in Colombia. Even though the total amount of cultivated coca plants 
decreased with Plan Colombia, the goal of “eliminating large-scale drug production” (Plan 
Colombia, 1999) has failed.  
Originally, the goals of Plan Colombia were to reduce cultivation, production, and trafficking 
by 50%. In this sense, Plan Colombia failed greatly. The concentration of the Plan on the 
elimination of coca cultivation has furthermore fuelled prices of coca, incentivising farmers 
who have not many other alternatives to clandestinely continue with growing of the illegal 
crop. Another fact that has to be considered when talking about coca cultivation and cocaine 
production in Colombia is what Mejía and Posada (2010) describe as “ballooning effect”, 
where coca cultivation has simply shifted to the neighbouring countries of Bolivia and Peru. 
The ballooning effect has also contributed to an increase of imports of raw coca to Colombia, 
where violent actors (including the state) still control the production and the distribution of the 
final product cocaine. Consequently, Bagley (2012) evaluates Plan Colombia’s effort in 
reducing cocaine production only ‘partially victorious’. He finds that despite all the efforts, “as 
of 2010 Colombia remained a principal source of coca leaf and refined cocaine in the Andes, 
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and drug-related violence and criminality appeared to be once again on the rise” (Bagley, 2012: 
5). The next section will explicitly look at these violence trends following the introduction of 
Plan Colombia.  
4.5 Plan Colombia: Violence Trends 
Another major goal of Plan Colombia was “to end large-scale violence and lawlessness by 
organized armed group, promote respect for human rights and break the link between armed 
groups and their narcotics industry support” (Plan Colombia, 1999). Table 9 provides an 
overview of the violence trends after Plan Colombia was implemented. The human rights 
violations of the FARC rebels increased shortly after the policy plan came into effect, as the 
guerrilla group was uprising against an imperialist invasion by the “North American hawks, 
hardliners and military generals” (FARC, 2011). However, since 2001 a dramatic decrease of 
FARC violence can be noted. Similar observations can be made for paramilitary violence. The 
decrease in paramilitary violence after 2003 can be explained by the launch of the DD&R 
programme, in which ex-combatants of paramilitary forces were offered short prison sentences 
and support in their reintegration in exchange for disarmament (Koth, 2005). 
These decreases in human rights violations by the illegal armed groups since 2000, as well as 
dramatic decreases in some of the main violence indicators, such as the homicide rate (43% 
decrease), the number of kidnappings (95% decrease) and the number of massacres (71.4% 
decrease) are arguments for the Colombian and the U.S. government to call Plan Colombia a 
success in reducing violence (DNP, 2006a; DeShazo et al., 2007; Table 9). The United States 
Government Accountability Office (GOA) in its 2008 report on Plan Colombia recognises that 
“(w)hile Plan Colombia’s drug reduction goals were not fully met, U.S. assistance has helped 
stabilize Colombia’s internal security situation by weakening the power of illegal armed 
groups” (GOA, 2008: 70). DeShazo et al. (2007; 2009) also find that U.S. assistance for Plan 
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Colombia resulted in increased security for the country, despite the policy’s overall ambiguous 
outcomes.  
However, this positive evaluation of Plan Colombia by some scholars and the U.S. government 
has severe flaws. Political motivations and researchers’ biases towards U.S. foreign policy 
weaken these findings beyond their short-sightedness of looking at the Colombian conflict in 
a one-dimensional way of. “good” vs. “bad” (i.e. Government vs. FARC). This impedes 
analyses of the wider story of human rights violations. For example, during the implementation 
of the Plan a huge surge in human rights violations of the public armed forces can be noted 
(Table 9). These violent acts of the public forces take form in the execution of civilians to 
increase the body count of allegedly killed guerrilla soldiers. Between 2004 and 2008 more 
than 3,000 civilians were extrajudicially executed in this “false positive” scandal7, where 
official army forces killed peasants, framers and other mostly poor people and dressed them in 
FARC uniforms to claim they were killed in battle (OHCHR, 2012). Furthermore, the violence 
acts of the FARC and the paramilitary continue, as thousands of people are killed each year in 
the conflict and even more are displaced from their communities (Bagley, 2012; Tickner, 
2007). According to a recent report by Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) 
Colombia has 6,044,200 internally displaced people – an equivalent to 15.83% of the national 
population – making Colombia the second country with the largest numbers in internal refugees 
worldwide (IDMC, 2015).  
In line with Hylton (2010), Ibáñez and Vélez (2008), and Dion and Russler (2008) and applying 
an OLS time-series model to our data set we also find that between 2000 and 2006 the aerial 
eradication efforts implemented through Plan Colombia only had marginal effects on cocaine 
production but had much more a positive effect on forced displacement, causing unintended 
                                                          
7 For further reading about the false positive scandal see Human Rights Watch (2011). 
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economic, human, and social costs. The results of these findings suggest that the eradication 
strategy of Plan Colombia has failed to consider negative externalities. The statistics of the 
Colombian Ministry of Defence of a decrease in homicides in Colombia by 43%, a drop in 
kidnappings by 95% and a decline in terrorist attacks by 47% between 2000 and 2013, need to 
be looked at with caution (see Ministerio de Defensa de Colombia, 2013).  
The results of our multidimensional analysis of the factors of violence are in line with Isacson 
(2010: 1) who finds that Colombia is “not a model” as security gains are “partial…and weighed 
down by ‘collateral damage.” Colombia’s homicide rate is still above 30 per 100,000, as both 
guerrillas and “new” paramilitary groups (so-called Bandas Criminales, BACRIMs) continue 
to extort businesses and to engage in drug trafficking, land piracy, and illegal gold mining 
(Haugaard et al., 2011; Porch and Rasmussen, 2008). However, and as Bagley (2012: 8) rightly 
points out, for the Colombian state “such organizations are far less threatening because they do 
not have the capacity to threaten state security directly.” 
The above analysis shows that Plan Colombia had ambiguous effects on violence trends in the 
country. While a decrease in FARC and paramilitary violence can be noted, the reforms have 
brought a non-trivial increase in human rights violations by government forces. Overall, 
violence trends in Colombia question whether the country has actually become safer after the 
implementation of Plan Colombia (see Rosen, 2014).   
5 Discussion 
This article has brought together findings about the socioeconomic effects of Colombia’s 
illegal drug industry to argue in favour of needing a policy response of some sort. Combining 
these findings with the analysis of the effectiveness of Plan Colombia this study has shown that 
while there was a need to intervene in the negative development of the country’s economy with 
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a targeted policy, Plan Colombia has failed to reach the goal to effectively combat illegal drug 
production and to foster economic development. Since this study includes both, a statistical 
analysis of the effects of violence and illegal drugs on Colombia’s economic growth, as well 
as an enhanced evaluation of the policy programme Plan Colombia, it has filled the gap 
between the existing empirical studies about the illegal drug industry and analyses of Plan 
Colombia. 
Looking at the findings of this study, the question arises what can be learned from the 
experience from Plan Colombia. While it is difficult to analyse possible counterfactual 
outcomes of what would have happened to the development of Colombia if Plan Colombia had 
not existed, there is a clear need to focus on new strategic development programmes and 
alternative policies. The emphasis of such new policies need to be placed on economic, 
political, and environmental issues of the Colombian conflict and on social issues, such as the 
reintegration of former paramilitary and guerrilla activists into the Colombian society. Since it 
is mostly in rural and underdeveloped regions and economically week periods where cocaine 
production still seems to be the only viable alternative for the agricultural population in 
Colombia, it is necessary to consider new policy approaches that focus on establishing local 
state capabilities that support institutional strategies of productive and sustainable 
development. Furthermore, policies that focus on providing access to legal market through 
urban and rural infrastructure would particularly help to curb cocaine production in 
economically underdeveloped areas. The current peace negotiations between the FARC and 
the Santos Administration give hope that more inclusive policies follow if the opposing sides 
reach an agreement. The peace process has been the most progressive and elaborate in 
Colombian history and includes explicit targets that aim to mitigate the social and economic 
consequences of the conflict in general and the drug economy in particular. Next to items such 
as agrarian reforms, political participation of the FARC, victim recognition and reconciliation, 
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the peace agreement aims to explicitly end the conflict and find solutions to the problems of 
illegal drugs (including a decriminalisation of cultivating farmers). The exact outcomes of the 
peace negotiations are yet to be awaited for, but the agreements that have already been reached 
in the dialogue have achieved more for the country then Plan Colombia ever has. 
6 Conclusion 
The main findings of this study are twofold. On one hand, this article helped a great deal to 
understand the economic and social problems the violent-prone Colombian illegal drug 
industry has brought onto the country’s society. The national level analysis of the influence of 
the illegal drug industry on the economic development has shown that cocaine production is a 
direct explanatory factor for the economic misfortune of Colombia in the 1990s. This illegal 
drug market breeds violence, which again is directly correlated to a decrease in economic 
activity. This indirect influence of the illegal drug industry has harmed the Colombian economy 
and the development of the country in a significant way.  
On the other hand, the extensive quantitative analysis of this study has helped to conclusively 
evaluate the policy programme of Plan Colombia. The analysis suggests that Plan Colombia 
was effective in reducing the amount of cultivated coca plants, but it was rather ineffective in 
reducing cocaine production. Violence and human rights violations of the illegal armed groups 
could be reduced. However, human rights violations of the official government forces surged 
during the implementation period, which can be associated with the increased militarisation of 
the Colombian conflict. Plan Colombia directly led to an intensification of the humanitarian 
problem of forced internal displacement in Colombia. The results of these findings show that 
the aerial eradication strategy of Plan Colombia has failed to consider social and humanitarian 
externalities.  
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The findings of this study suggest that future research is needed in analysing developments of 
alternative policy initiatives that focus on decriminalisation and regulation instead of repression 
of illegal drugs. The lessons provided by the Colombian experience should be considered in 
future analyses of possible counternarcotic policies, including policy considerations for 
Colombia itself, if the peace negotiations conclude successfully. 
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 Table 1: Net Total Income in Colombia from Illegal Drugs (in millions U.S. Dollar)  
 
 
Year 
        Rocha 
  Cocaine 
(min&max) 
(1997) 
 
 Heroin 
 
 
Marijuana 
 
 
   Total 
(min&max) 
 
Percentage 
of GDP  
 
Cocaine 
Steiner 
Heroin 
(1998) 
Marijuana 
 
Total 
 
Percentage 
of GDP 
1980 
     1386   1386 2.5% 
1981 1358   1358 2.4% 1933  137 2070 3.7% 
1982 
2484  133 2617 4.7% 1819  65 1884 3.4% 
1983 
1294  133 1427 2.5% 1868  79 1947 3.4% 
1984 
671  83 754 1.2% 4093   79 4172 7.0% 
1985 
947-3817  26 973-3843 1.5%-6.3% 2933  20 2953 4.9% 
1986 
845-3340  21 866-3361 1.3%-4.9% 939  34 973 1.5% 
1987 
493-2386  57 550-2443 0.8%-3.6% 1311  152 1463 2.2% 
1988 
533-3658  49 582-3707 0.8%-5.2% 1395  290 1685 2.4% 
1989 
677-6677  22 699-6699 1%-9.2% 2485  94 2579 3.6% 
1990 
503-6435  20 523-6455 0.7%-8.3% 2341  48 2389 3.1% 
42 
  
A
ppendix 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Rocha (1997); Steiner (1998)
1991 
161-3965 27 45 233-4037 0.3%-5.1% 1400 750 83 2233 2.8% 
1992 
331-3323 163 53 547-3539 0.6%-4.3% 1822 750 89 2661 3.2% 
1993 
357-2999 270 140 767-3409 0.9%-4.0% 1363 750 386 2481 2.9% 
1994 
194-2625 424 182 801-3232 0.9%-3.6% 1176  750 329 2255 2.5% 
1995 
     1446 750 333 2529 2.7% 
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Figure 1: Economic Performance of Colombia and Coca Bush Cultivation 
 
Sources: DANE, 2005; UNODC, 2008. 
 
 
Figure 2: Violence Trends and Coca Cultivation 1990-1999 (H.R.: human rights)
 
Sources: CINEP, UNODC 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Illegal Drugs and Violence 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation  
Observations 
H
o
m
i
c
i
d
e 
R
a
t
e 
49.03 60.15 12298 
C
o
c
a 
C
o
p
s 
i
92.73 614.54 12237 
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n 
H
e
c
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e
s 
C
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n
e 
P
r
o
d
u
c
ti
o
n 
527.05 3231.32 12237 
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C
o
c
a 
P
r
o
d
u
c
ti
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n 
V
a
l
u
e 
944.54 5674.86 12237 
F
A
R
C 
P
r
e
0.38 0.48 12276 
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s
e
n
c
e  
A
U
C 
P
r
e
s
e
n
c
e  
0.16 0.37 12276 
Sources: Mejía and Restrepo (2011); CINEP; UNODC (2012) 
  
 
Table 3: Impact of Coca value on homicide rates controlled by armed group 
Independent variable 𝜷𝜷 
Coca Value 0.089*** 
(0.028)  
FARC 0.485*** 
(0.056) 
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Paramilitary 0.465*** 
(0.055) 
R2 0.301 
*** p< 0.01 
Sources: Mejía and Restrepo (2011); CINEP; UNODC (2012) 
 
Table 4: National Level Fixed Effects Model of FARC HR Violations (lagged) 1993-1999 
(T=7) 
Independent Variable 𝜷𝜷 
GDP per Capita −5.90269**       
(1.40847) 
Paramilitary HR Violations 0.260987**   
(.0585797)   
Government HR Violations −0.256825**   (.0682946) 
Constant  57.0994       
(12.6853)** 
R2 0.587298    
 ** p< 0.05 
Table 5: National Level Fixed Effects Model of Paramilitary HR Violations (lagged) 1993-
1999 
Independent 
Variable 
𝜷𝜷 
GDP per 
Capita 
15.3500**       
4.65548       
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FARC HR 
Violations 
1.59507* 
0.605725    
Government 
HR 
Violations 
0.880315**     
0.246399      
Constant  −142.056**      
43.9993       
R2 0.711103    
*p< 0.10; ** p< 0.05;  
Figure 3: Hectares of Coca Crops vs. Potential Cocaine Production   
 
Source: UNODC (2008) 
 
  
Figure 4: The Productivity of Coca per Hectare 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
Source: UNODC (2008) 
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Table 6: U.S. Assistance to Plan Colombia 2000-2006 (in millions of US$) 
Programme 
Objective/ 
fiscal year 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Reduce Illicit 
Narcotics and 
improve 
Security 
817.8 232.8 395.9 607.9 617.7 585.6 587.3 
Promote Social 
and Economic 
Justice 
80 0.5 109.9 125.7 126.5 124.7 130.4 
Promote Rule 
of Law 
121.1 0.9 15.8 27.0 9.0 7.3 10.5 
Total 1,018.9 234.2 521.6 760.6 753.2 717.6 728.2 
Sources: GAO (2008); DNP (2006) 
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Table 7: Assistance provided to the Colombian Military and National Police 2000-2006 (in millions of US$) 
Service/ fiscal year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Colombian Military 683.5 192.8 257.1 443.4 445.5 394.7 382.8 
Army Aviation * * 78.0 140.8 155.2 127.5 143.2 
Army Ground Forces * * 9.7 6.3 18.1 13.4 22.2 
Infrastructure Security  * * 6.0 93.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Air Interdictiona No program No program 14.0 8.0 7.1 0.0 4.6 
Coastal and River Interdiction * * 0.0 0.0 26.2 11.8 19.1 
Otherb 134.9 190.9 149.4 195.4 234.8 238.1 189.7 
Not allocated* 548.6 1.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Colombian National Police 134.3 40.0 138.8 164.5 172.2 190.9 204.5 
Eradication * * 37.4 63.7 44.2 82.5 81.7 
Air Service * * 67.5 62.3 71.2 70.0 70.5 
Interdiction * * 24.3 21.0 41.0 16.9 16.5 
Police Presence in Conflict Zones No program No program 4.8 15.5 13.8 20.1 19.4 
  
Otherc 18.7 0.0 4.9 2.0 2.0 1.4 16.4 
Not Allocated* 115.6 40.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total 817.8 232.8 395.9 607.9 617.7 585.6 587.3 
*State could not allocate appropriations by program category in fiscal years 2000 and 2001.  
a This category addresses State’s Air Bridge Denial program 
b Includes Defense counternarcotics funding   
c Includes other major expenses such as a portion of State’s Critical Flight Safety Program.  
Source: GOA (2008) 
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Table 8: National Level Fixed Effects Model on Cocaine Production 2000-2006 (T=7) 
Independent 
Variable 
𝜷𝜷 
Eradication (lagged) 0.0229684     
0.0197252 
U.S. Assistance to 
Plan Colombia 
(lagged) 
0.0490166     
0.0373099 
Colombian 
Expenditure on 
defence and security 
(lagged) 
−0.289435      
0.169559 
Constant 6.25600*** 
0.468576 
R2 0.323416    
*** p< 0.01 
 
Table 9: Main Indicators for violence in Colombia 2000-2006 
Indica
tor 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Homi
cide 
rate 
per 
62.7 64.7 65.9 53.2 44.0 39.1 37.5 
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100,0
00 
inhabi
tants  
No. of 
Kidna
pping
s 
3,572 2,917 2,882 2,121 1,441 800 687 
No. of 
Massa
cres*  
236 185 115 94 46 48 37 
FAR
C 
Viole
nce 
489 1,092 362 296 204 125 168 
Para
milita
ry 
Viole
nce 
1,191 875 1,144 849 649 258 510 
Public 
Force 
Viole
nce 
270 470 379 580 752 686 758 
* defined by the government as killings of four or more persons. 
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Sources: DNP; CINEP; National Ministry of Defence (MDN)  
